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It is a distinct pleasure to participate in this important forum on the role of social clauses 
in international trade. For a number of years, the International Labor Rights Fund has 
been working to establish a linkage between the way goods are produced and the trade in 
those goods, arguing from the common sense awareness that gave birth to the ILO in 
1919, namely, that "failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an 
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own 
countries." (ILO Constitution, Preamble)  
In the arcane world of trade dominated today by practitioners of extreme laissez-faire 
economic theories, this effort has met with unyielding resistance, buttressed by every 
possible use of econometric analysis to demonstrate the folly of tinkering with the free 
flow of goods and investment for social reasons. Governments of some developing 
countries have seized the initiative to condemn the notion of a "social clause" as the latest 
effort by more powerful trading nations to undermine their cheap-wage competitive 
advantage, and ironically, in some countries, their claims have been echoed by trade 
union centers who seem to be unaware that it is their own standards and wage levels that 
are being undermined by the globalization of their economies. Even efforts to slow the 
trade in goods made under conditions of child servitude have been labeled protectionist, 
as though the competitive advantage of any country depended on the employment of 
children rather than adults.  
The issue of trade related standards has thus become highly polarized, charged more with 
invective and accusation than with efforts to strengthen the quality of life for workers and 
communities as a result or condition of trade growth.    
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In this climate of non-dialogue, it may be useful to examine the North American Free 
Trade Agreement's negotiated side-pact on labor, for it represents the first effort by 
countries of greatly different levels of development to establish -- ever so gingerly -- an 
instrument to push forward labor standards deliberately as an aspect of trade 
liberalization. Whether the instrument is sufficient to this task, or whether it is sufficient 
only to create the appearance of progress, are appropriate questions to ask. We would 
argue that the jury is still out on that question, but that there are important lessons to be 
learned already from the experience of the first two years.    
From the day that the negotiation of a U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement was 
announced in 1990, trade unions, human rights organizations and environmental groups 
realized we faced a huge challenge, to create a space within the trade debate where the 
people of the U.S. and Mexico could work together to make certain that increased 
economic integration contributed to broadly-based development rather than the 
exploitation of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each country's economy. In early 
January, 1991, as Canada was being drawn into the trade talks, this challenge was taken 
up by a tri-national conference in Washington DC. There, to an audience of 500 trade 
lawyers and Congressional staff, environmental, labor and agricultural activists and 
academics from the three countries issued a challenge to the negotiators to "Open Up the 
Debate." Shortly thereafter, a tri-national network of organizations was born to monitor 
the official negotiations and propose to each of the governments elements of a trade 
agreement that would strengthen, rather than weaken the ability of each country to 
preserve or achieve high environmental standards, labor rights and sovereign agricultural 
and rural development policy.    
For three years, this network, comprised of 120 Mexican organizations in the Mexican 
Action Network on Free Trade, more than 100 organizations in two U.S. groupings, the 
Alliance for Responsible Trade and the Citizens Trade Campaign, and some 40 or more 
Canadian member groups in the Action Canada Network, worked together to argue in 
every possible forum for an alternative to the neo-liberal market-driven approach of the 
three governments. It was a remarkable effort, primarily because it was the first broadly-
based social movement in the three countries to work toward a common agenda and 
approach to the problems of an extremely diverse region. Canada, by virtue of its small 
population scattered along three thousand miles of border with the United States, has long 
felt the cultural and economic dominance of its neighbor to the south. On the other hand, 
Mexico and the U.S. , joined by a two thousand mile-long border, have historically been 
divided by vast differences of culture, language and economic development. Seldom in 
the past had activists in the United States focused seriously on the problems of its 
neighbors on either side. Thus, social organizations of the three countries had much to 
overcome as well as to accomplish to achieve consensus about the character and future of 
regional economic integration.    
While this campaign was ultimately unsuccessful in changing the terms of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement that was signed by President Bush shortly before 
leaving office, it did have the effect of awakening a massive public debate in all three 
countries over the potential costs of free trade: pressures to transfer production to Mexico 
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to take advantage of cheap wages and low environmental regulation, the intensification of 
private economic and political power in Mexico to the detriment of democratic 
development, the bargaining down of wages and working conditions among companies 
that did not actually transfer production, and pressure on countries to eliminate social 
programs that are attacked as unfair trade benefits or barriers, in the name of remaining 
competitive. The debate highlighted also the potentially damaging effect of agricultural 
policy changes in Mexico to prepare for NAFTA that were causing a massive rural 
exodus that threatened to increase the migration pressures on the U.S. border.    
The impact of this debate was such that in the 1994 presidential campaign, Democratic 
candidate Bill Clinton, who had long supported free trade in principle, was obliged to put 
some social conditions around his backing for NAFTA. In his speech at Raleigh, North 
Carolina, on October 4, 1992, Clinton warned, "For a high wage country like ours, the 
blessings of more trade can be offset at least in part by the loss of income and jobs as 
more and more multi-national corporations take advantage of their ability to move 
money, management, and production away from a high wage country to a low wage 
country...We can also lose income because those companies who stay at home can use 
the threat of moving to depress wages as many do today." (Clinton p. 3). And with 
respect to Mexico, he observed, "There is certainly cause for concern. We can see clearly 
there that labor standards have been regularly violated . . . . So there is some reason to 
fear that there are people in this world and in our country who would take advantage of 
any provisions insuring more investment opportunities simply to look for lower wages 
without regard to the human impact of their decisions." (Id at 5).    
In his campaign speeches, Clinton observed that the NAFTA negotiated by Carla Hills on 
behalf of the Bush Administration, "does nothing to affirm our right to insist that the 
Mexicans follow their own labor standards," which, he noted, were "now frequently 
violated." "Perhaps the toughest issue of all," he said, "is how to obtain better 
enforcement of laws already on the books on environment and worker standards. It's 
interesting that the agreement negotiated by the Bush team goes a long way to do this in 
protecting intellectual property rights and the right to invest in Mexico, but is silent with 
respect to labor laws and the environment." (Clinton P. 15).    
Accordingly, Clinton indicated that if elected he would send the NAFTA agreement to 
Congress for ratification only after he had negotiated two side agreements, one on 
environment and one on labor. On labor, his proposed solution, which with some changes 
after nine months became the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), was to ensure that Mexican workers would have a fair chance to bargain for a 
greater share of productivity gains, thus narrowing, over time, the wage gap with 
American workers, and deepening the Mexican domestic market for goods and services, 
including, potentially, those from the United States. And the key to ensuring that 
opportunity was to require Mexico to enforce its own constitution and labor laws. Article 
123 of the Mexican constitution and the Mexican Labor Law, on their face, assure the 
right of free association, to bargain collectively and to strike. If the constitution and the 
Mexican labor law were respected in practice, then, presumably, Mexican workers would 
be enabled to form truly independent labor unions and these unions would be capable of 
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bargaining effectively for a fairer share of productivity gains. Each agreement, Clinton 
said, "should contain a wide variety of procedural safeguards and remedies that we take 
for granted here in our country, such as easy access to the courts, public hearings, the 
right to present evidence, streamlined procedures and effective remedies..." (Id).    
Following his inauguration in early 1993, President Clinton authorized the negotiation of 
these two agreements. Talks began with Mexico in March, and the two partners were 
joined by Canada shortly thereafter. The talks concluded in September, 1993 in an 
agreement which bore only partial resemblance to the lofty goals Candidate Clinton had 
articulated the previous year.    
Citizens groups in the coalitions mentioned above differed in their approach to the side 
agreements. On the whole, Canadian and some U.S. groups were skeptical that any side 
agreement could be negotiated which would have any positive effect; rather, they feared, 
the labor and environmental agreements would simply add an acceptable aura of 
responsibility to the basic trade agreement without altering any of the basic standard-
lowering elements of NAFTA itself. Others, including the ILRF, pressed for the best 
possible outcome in the belief that, with or without a labor side agreement, the economic 
integration that NAFTA codified was underway. Even if such a labor agreement were 
weaker than desired, it would be preferable to having no agreement at all. We proposed 
seven elements of a successful agreement:  
1. An Agreement on base-line regional minimum labor standards.    
The U.S., Canada and Mexico all have extensive and progressive labor legislation in 
place, albeit with differing lacunae in each country, and with quite differing levels of 
enforcement. As ILRF noted in the study we commissioned of labor rights in Mexico, 
(Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today by Dan La Botz, South End 
Press, 1992) Mexico's labor law, enshrined in the Constitution itself and in Federal Law 
No. 123, provides a higher degree of protection of the livelihood and collective rights of 
workers, in principle, than do the laws of either the United States or Canada. However, 
Mexican labor laws are subject to very spasmodic and politically-determined 
enforcement as a result of 60 years of one-party rule and a captive state-party-controlled 
labor movement. For example, Mexico's constitution mandates a minimum wage which is 
adequate for an adult worker to provide for food, shelter and clothing for a five-member 
family. However, in a country in which almost half the population is considered by the 
World Health Organization to be malnourished, where as the New York Times noted, 
(March 9, 1993, p. D2) it took nearly four times the minimum wage for a small Mexican 
household to survive, it is easy to see that the minimum wage law is not observed. During 
the last decade before NAFTA, the minimum wage had declined by about 60 percent in 
real purchasing value.    
In a conflict situation arising under NAFTA, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to 
insist on the enforcement in Mexico of Mexican laws that exceed actual standards in U.S. 
law. By the same token, it would be difficult for Mexico to insist on enforcement of 
elements of U.S. law that exceed Mexican practice. Canadians, who have already 
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complained that U.S. "Right to Work" laws constitute an unfair trade subsidy to cheap-
labor garment factories in the American South, would have a hard time getting U.S. 
courts to enforce Canadian standards, which for the most part bar such practices.    
Therefore, we argued, it was important that a regional agreement establish which labor 
rights and standards are to be observed by all parties in connection with cross-border 
trade, as the basis for any actions that became necessary to root out unacceptable labor 
practices under NAFTA. Simply insisting on "national enforcement of national laws" 
would lead to a morass of conflicts and confusion.  
We proposed that all three countries accept as a basic floor of standards the key ILO 
Conventions. There was a singular advantage in this approach, namely, that Mexico has 
ratified a majority of these basic conventions, while Canada has ratified more than half of 
them. In Mexico the ratified ILO Conventions are given self-executing status as national 
law. To any ratifying nation, each Convention carries an obligation to bring national law 
into compliance. The United States has long resisted ratification of most ILO 
Conventions, for dubious reasons of constitutional law, but, we contended, it would be to 
our national advantage to do so at that time in order to establish a basis for agreement 
with Mexico and Canada on the basic definitions of the labor standards to be incorporated 
into NAFTA.    
2. An Agreement on the level of violation that constitutes an actionable unfair trade 
practice.    
It was very important, we contended, that the negotiations establish as a matter of 
agreement among the three party states that violations of labor rights are unfair trade 
practices, subject to demands for correction or, failing that, to countervailing actions 
within the framework of trade. How to characterize the level of violations which are 
sufficient to trigger a countervailing action, however, would require careful negotiation. 
We believed there should be a range of sanctions available to cope with increasingly 
serious or systemic violations, in which the level of distortion of trade is one factor. The 
driving principle in determining actions should be the correction of the offending 
practice, not the cutoff of trade, which should be reserved for the most serious offenses or 
those which offending states fail to correct after a reasonable period of time. In the 
establishment of sanctions, the principle of proportionality should be carefully 
maintained.    
3. An Agreement on complaint procedures that includes access, standing and freedom of 
choice of venue.    
We argued it should be agreed by all parties that any person who believes labor rights as 
defined by this agreement have been violated in cases involving cross-border transactions 
should have the right to file complaints directly to the dispute resolution mechanism 
established therein. This access should not be contingent on asking that person's 
government to file the complaint on his or her behalf.    
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4. An Agreement to Form a Tri-National Labor Standards Commission which is 
democratic in its selection and open in its proceedings.    
We believed that for such a commission to be significant, it would need to have both a 
developmental and dispute resolution role. It should be tasked both with furthering the 
development of common standards in North America within the parameters established in 
the agreement, and adjudicating complaints brought under the terms of those agreed-upon 
standards. In resolving disputes, it is necessary that the parties agree that the 
Commission's findings have the force of law.    
5. Establishment of a Process and Timetable to Harmonize Wage and Health and Safety 
Standards Upward.    
There needed to be included in these supplementary negotiations a commitment to 
development mechanisms that would both mandate and assist Mexico to raise its wages, 
at least to the 1982 comparative level, over the next period of years. This could be 
through tax relief measures linked to higher wages, to development bank funds targeted 
at wage enhancement, through negotiated requirements to raise the minimum wage by a 
certain percentage of average industrial wages per year, or by a combination of these and 
other mechanisms. The primary point was that there needed to be a deliberate effort 
outlined in the agreement which had real, as well as realistic goals to achieve during the 
ten years or so that the trade agreement is being phased in.    
6. Agreement on certain kinds of products which each country could prevent from 
entering into its territory.    
This should in our opinion include:    
1. products that are made, harvested or processed by child labor (defined in 
accordance with ILO Convention 138 as children under 15, not including children 
working under the direct supervision of their own immediate family members.)   
2. products made, harvested or processed by prisoners or under conditions of forced 
or compulsory labor.    
3. products made under conditions or with processes that are banned in its own 
territory due to the deleterious effects of that process on workers' health or safety. 
   
7. Agreement on a process to negotiate particular protocols for protecting the rights of 
immigrant workers and indigenous workers and tribal populations.    
Mexico rightly expressed the need for a regularization of immigration and protection for 
the rights of immigrant workers, as a part of the economic integration underway among 
our countries. Under pressure from the Bush Administration, these demands were 
dropped from the agenda of NAFTA itself. However, the problems had not gone away 
and, if anything, would be exacerbated by the economic changes caused by and 
accompanying NAFTA. The outset of NAFTA implementation, we believed, was the 
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correct time to recognize these issues and put into effect a process to assure protection of 
the rights of immigrant workers and indigenous peoples.    
The Resulting Agreement    
NAALC, as finally negotiated, referenced no international code of standards such as ILO 
conventions. It established no machinery by which a dispute could be investigated to 
uncover information not in the public record or to subpoena reluctant witnesses. It did not 
provide an effective trade sanctions remedy for violation by any of the signatory states of 
the core worker rights of free association, collective bargaining or the right to strike. The 
Clinton Administration conceded to Mexican objections and deleted from the final draft 
the possibility of such sanctions for violation of core worker rights. Where violations are 
alleged, the only remedy under the NAALC is the possibility of "consultations" at the 
ministerial level. Nor did it establish any regular or systematic program for the upward 
harmonization of wages and health and safety standards.    
However, the agreement did establish a set of eleven agreed-upon "labor principles" to 
which each party indicated its commitment. (See Appendix I) It set up an open process 
for receiving and adjudicating complaints about non-compliance with a country's own 
labor law, in connection with all eleven principles. A Commission was formed, made up 
of the labor ministers of the three countries, with a small secretariat limited to fifteen 
professional staff. That commission has the task of fostering, not harmonization of 
standards, but the betterment of basic protections for labor in each of the eleven areas of 
labor principles. Protection of immigrant workers' rights was included as one of the 
eleven principles, although indigenous people were given no mention. Nor was the 
principle of allowing the banning of specific products, e.g. those made by child or prison 
labor, accepted.    
In sum, the NAALC spoke to virtually all of our concerns, although in a weakened and 
less ideal format which preserved national sovereignty over labor law matters at every 
point.    
This was in sharp contrast to provisions in NAFTA relating to intellectual property or 
investment, where national sovereignty yielded almost without a whimper to the demands 
of international capital.   
Nevertheless, NAALC did create a structure whereby issues of labor rights and standards 
could be discussed comparatively and linked to trade, where the trade effects of widely 
variant practices could be assessed and where complaints about non-compliance by a 
country with its own labor law could be, if not adjudicated to everyone's satisfaction, at 
least exposed and discussed. It also created a set of obligations that the labor law 
enforcement mechanisms be transparent, and without partiality.   
It is this complaint mechanism and this obligation to non-biased labor courts that I want 
to discuss in some detail, for it is our view that this is the heart of the agreement. If it 
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succeeds, NAALC succeeds. If it fails, no amount of joint research or comparative 
analysis or technical assistance will make much difference.    
The agreement creates a three-tiered structure.  
1. National Administrative Offices (NAOs) were established in each country's labor 
ministry to serve as a conduit between that national government, the NAALC 
Commission and the other NAFTA parties. 
2. The labor ministers jointly form a Commission which meets at least annually, or 
on the request of any of the ministers. 
3. The Commission is served by a Secretariat, composed of a maximum of 15 
professional staff. These are chosen from names selected by the three countries 
but constitute an international body that can act independent of any one of the 
governments. 
   
The complaint process is also three-tiered. Anyone may bring a complaint to one of the 
NAOs charging that one of the other parties is failing to enforce its labor law. Complaints 
-- or submissions, as they are called in order to avoid the appearance of a judicial process 
-- are reviewed by the NAO along procedural guidelines established by that NAO. If the 
submission is found to have merit, a hearing may be called within a set period of time. 
Finally, a decision will be issued, with recommendations to that country's labor minister 
regarding resolution of the issue.    
At this point, the process gets differentiated, depending on the "Labor Principle" under 
discussion. If the matter has to do with the first three labor principles, freedom of 
association, collective bargaining or the right to strike, an NAO can only recommend, in 
addition to more study, that the ministers of Labor hold a consultation on the subject. If 
the matter is in the area of the other eight principles - called "technical standards" in the 
jargon of the agreement, then a ministerial consultation may be followed, if the matter 
remains unresolved, by the convening of an "Evaluative Committee of Experts" (ECE), 
chosen from a roster of names provided by each country. If the issue relates to persistent 
violations of minimum wage law, child labor or health and safety in an area where the 
complaining country and the country complained against have parallel laws, and the 
matter concerns a trade-related sector of the economy and is unresolved by the work or 
recommendation of the ECE, then one of the parties in the case may request an arbitration 
panel be convened.    
Only on these last three issues can an arbitration panel decide, if its efforts to resolve the 
issue fail, to levy either a fine or a trade sanction in an amount established in the 
agreement at $20 million maximum in 1994. The fine is collected from the country 
complained against, and then turned over to that same country to remedy the problem!    
This process, from complaint to fine, can take upwards of three years! Clearly, "swift" 
and "effective" were not words that leapt to the minds of the negotiators. In fact, it was 
reported the Mexican Secretary of Commerce, Jaime Serra-Puche, reported to the 
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Mexican Congress that they need not fear. The process was so convoluted that nothing 
would ever reach a punitive conclusion.    
Clearly, if the NAALC dispute resolution has merit, it is not due to the force of the 
agreement's trade sanctions. I believe, however, that there is merit to the process, and, 
although only a few cases have been brought by either Mexico or the U.S., and none so 
far by Canada, it is possible to see the agreement having some positive effect.    
Three cases have been filed in the U.S., and one in Mexico, all having to do with the 
rights of association and collective bargaining. The first two cases, against General 
Electric in Ciudad Juarez and Honeywell in Tijuana, Mexico, had to do with company 
actions to fire unions organizers and manipulate union elections to prevent the collective 
bargaining rights from being transferred to a new unions from the existing government-
party related union, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM).    
Both there cases were dismissed by the US-NAO after a hearing, on the grounds that they 
had failed to demonstrate sufficiently that the Mexican government had been remiss.  
The third complaint, brought by the ILRF together with the Mexican Democratic 
Lawyers Association and several border groups, was similar in content. The Sony 
Corporation's subsidiary in Nuevo Laredo, Magneticos de Mexico, changed work rules in 
late 1993 to require illegally long overtime work. When workers complained to their 
union, which was a CTM -based sweet heart union, it refused to negotiate a change in 
work rules. When workers tried to elect new union officers, the union expelled them from 
its membership and the company then fired the workers, under the closed shop rules in 
place. When other workers protested against these firings, they too were fired. When they 
appealed to the local labor court (Conciliation and Arbitration Board - CAB) made up of 
government, employers and CTM representatives, their complaints were dismissed. A 
CTM-called union election, held with less than six hours notice, resulted in a mass walk 
out by two thirds of the workforce, followed by a sit-down strike at the factory gate that 
was suppressed by extreme police violence.    
When the workers then tried to organize an independent union, the Tamaulipas State 
CAB rejected their application on flimsy and spurious technical grounds.    
At that point in the saga we filed a complaint with the U.S. NAO, alleging government-
company collusion to prevent freedom of association.    
This complaint was accepted for review, and, in our opinion, given a fair hearing by the 
US-NAO. At the conclusion of the review, the NAO recommended a ministerial 
consultation to be held on the subject of union registration, and for several unilateral 
studies to be conducted. The ministerial process, which concluded in June, 1995, decided 
to hold three public fora on union registration - one in Mexico, one in the U.S. and one in 
Canada, and to hold discussions with the Sony workers, management and local CAB 
officials. These fora were completed in March, 1996, and a final report is now being 
drafted. (For text of the Ministerial Decision, see Appendix II.)    
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The Sony workers still do not have an effective or representative union.    
Why, it might well be asked, do we believe this process has merit, if it is unable to bring 
any justice in a matter so transparently and flagrantly in violation of the legal rights of 
Mexican workers.  
Tentatively, I would answer that the process has created an opening, for the first time, for 
public discussion in Mexico about the impunity of the country's corporatist union 
structure and its failure to provide for fair representation for workers. It allowed a large 
and angry audience in the Mexico City forum to challenge openly, in front of U.S. and 
Canadian officials and the international press, the collusion of government officials, 
companies and a kept union. It placed Mexican government officials on the defensive in 
an international forum for the first time in recent years, making it impossible to hide 
behind the splendid rhetoric of Mexico's Article 123.    
Secondly, it indirectly created political space within a mildly reformist government for 
other changes to take place. This was most dramatically seen just one week ago when the 
Mexican Supreme Court ruled that a law allowing only one union by name in the federal 
sector was unconstitutional. This ruling, reversing a 1984 law of the state of Jalisco and a 
local CAB ruling in Oaxaca in 1994, declared that Article 123 of the Constitution and 
ILO Convention 87, which Mexico signed in 1950, overrode any laws that limited the 
right of workers to join an existing union, form a new one or a right to refuse to be part of 
any labor organization.    
This historic ruling is, according to press reports "seen as indirectly responding to 
criticism from U.S. and Canadian labor unions aired at forums held under the auspices of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement . . . The issue came up during discussions of a 
1994 case involving former Sony Corporation workers in the state of Tamaulipas who 
were fired after trying to form a union independent of the existing one" (Dora Delgado, 
Daily Labor Report, May 28, 1996)    
The ILO has long complained, through rulings by the Freedom of Association Committee 
and the Committee of Experts, that Mexico's laws creating a single union for federal 
workers violate its obligations under convention 87. However, the public spot light and 
criticism brought through the NAFTA complaint process appear to have trumped the ILO 
in generating a positive response.    
All this notwithstanding, the Sony workers are still without an independent union. Armed 
with this Supreme Court decision, however, they stand a stronger chance at success when 
they refile their application, even in Tamaulipas where the CTM has been the most 
powerful political force for half a century.    
To undergird that effort, ILRF has formally requested that the Sony case ministerial 
consultation be reopened, specifically on the question of Article 4 and 5 of NAALC.(1) 
These articles create an obligation to administer labor law fairly, without bias, and in 
transparent and accessible proceedings. In the state of Tamaulipas -- and other states -- 
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the body that accepts or rejects union registration requests is comprised of representatives 
of the union which the applicants are challenging. To fail to recuse members of the CAB 
with a conflict of interest undermines the treaty obligation to have labor court 
proceedings without bias or without interested persons making rulings.    
This request, which if rejected will become the basis for a new submission, will test the 
very heart of Mexico's corporatist labor structure. With a Supreme Court decision having 
overturned state law relating to government employees, and the right of employees not to 
join a union having been reasserted, the legal basis for the rejection of the Sony workers' 
registration has narrowed considerably.    
A complaint based on a failure to meet a treaty obligation of NAALC rather than on 
failure to enforce specific labor laws raises an interesting set of questions. No procedure 
has been established to adjudicate charges of treaty violations themselves. Does this 
mean such a case could if unresolved through dialogue go before an international trade 
court? Frankly, it is not certain, but the implications of a complaint of this nature are 
immense, inasmuch as the efficacy of all other aspects of the labor agreement are 
contingent on meeting the obligation to fair processes. We will be pursuing this matter 
intently over the next several months.    
Finally, it should be noted that Mexico has filed one complaint against the United States. 
The issue relates to the Sprint Company's closing of a Spanish-language phone facility in 
San Francisco allegedly to avoid a union organizing drive. That complaint, which was 
brought to the Mexican NAO by the telephone workers union of Mexico in conjunction 
with the Communication Workers of America and the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph 
International (PTTI) resulted in a hearing conducted in San Francisco in February, 1996. 
The matter is currently awaiting a decision by the National Labor Relations Board in the 
United States before it is resolved by the Mexican NAO. While the gravamen of this case 
is on company actions rather than failure of the U.S. to enforce labor law, the bringing of 
this complaint by Mexico has had the salutary effect of solidifying Mexican government 
commitment to the NAALC process, which can now be seen as an instrument available to 
all the NAFTA partners and not just a means of badgering Mexico.  
The conference planners asked me to speak to two other questions regarding NAALC:  
How have Corporations responded? And what is the impact on this process of a more 
conservative Congress since 1994?    
U.S. companies exerted considerable effort to redefine the agreement to exclude all 
activity that does not consist of "labor cooperation". The U.S. Council for International 
Business, the lobbying wing of the 400 largest U.S. based multinational corporations, 
protested during the discussion period for establishing regulations to govern the activities 
of the U.S.-NAO that allowing complaints to be filed and reviewed would undermine the 
'cooperative' character of the agreement, which, they maintained, limited activities to 
sharing information among the NAFTA signatories about labor markets, labor laws and 
employment matters.    
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Having failed in the attempt to limit NAALC in this way, USCIB has vociferously 
protested every occasion when an individual company is named in any NAO document, 
insisting that the agreement does not allow corporations to be mentioned or criticized 
since it is focused on country not company practices. You will see the effect of this 
pressure in the early reports on the Sony case, which do not mention the Sony 
Corporation by name.    
Finally, USCIB, Business Round Table and other corporate lobby groups have set as a 
high priority prevention of any further labor side agreements from being negotiated with 
countries such as Chile seeking accession to NAFTA. While this issue is currently off the 
table due to a failure of the Republican-dominated Congress to grant "fast-track" 
negotiating authority to the Clinton Administration, after the next election, regardless 
who wins, the question of the terms of accession to a NAALC will become a heated 
controversy.    
Conclusions  
Has the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation made a difference in the 
quality of labor rights protection in any of the three countries?  
The short answer is not much. I have gone into this level of detail regarding the Sony 
case because it demonstrates the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the complaint 
machinery of NAALC.    
First the weaknesses:  
• There are no means in this agreement to bring effective pressure to correct the 
most prevalent problems of labor relations in Mexico, namely freedom of 
association, the right of collective bargaining and the right to strike. The 
instrument of "ministerial consultation" has proved to be inadequate to the task of 
motivating genuine reform. 
• The adjudication process for labor disputes is unduly long. Workers challenging 
the infringement of their rights have in all cases so far been unable to withstand 
the varieties of governmental, company and political pressures mounted against 
them long enough for the NAALC process to come to their assistance. 
• The sanctions at the end of the process are inadequate to coerce better behavior. 
Should a case ever go all the way to arbitration, it would still result in such a 
nominal fine or trade sanction as to be of little or no coercive effect. Further, since 
sanctions are levied, not against the violator, a company suppressing labor rights, 
but against the country which has tolerated that suppression, there is little 
incentive for companies to comply, except in order to avoid a certain amount of 
negative publicity. 
• There are no common standards. If Chile should accede to NAALC, it would in 
several areas of labor law be held to a considerably lower level of protection of 
workers' rights than the other NAFTA partners, since Chile's labor law--enacted 
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during the Pinochet regime--remains one of the weakest systems of legal 
protection of workers in the Americas. 
• Finally, the principle of "national enforcement of national law" provides an open 
invitation to lower the standards of national legislation. NAALC provides no 
assurance that current levels of labor rights protection will be sustained into the 
future by national law in any of the countries, nor does it provide for renegotiation 
of the terms of the agreement in the event any country should weaken its current 
labor law. 
   
The strengths of the agreement, on the other hand include the following:  
• NAALC recognizes the legitimate linkage between the conditions of labor and 
trade in goods produced by that labor. 
• The submissions filed so far have significantly improved dialogue and mutuality 
among the party states on matters of labor relations and labor law. 
• The agreement has provided a public forum for debate regarding the adequacy of 
existing law and administration, and a certain consequent level of transparency in 
the administration of labor law. While this has not resulted in direct gains for the 
persons most directly affected, it ha, according to Mexican government officials, 
resulted in a level of caution by both companies and administrators regarding 
actions elsewhere that might subject a company or an administrative organ to 
public scrutiny through the NAALC process. 
   
While the process is young, experimental and fraught with the limitations mentioned 
above, there are also several lessons that might be drawn for the broader, global debate 
about labor standards and trade. First, the importance of common standards, rather than 
national enforcement of national law, is underscored by the NAFTA experience. Second, 
trade sanctions, which in NAALC have not yet been invoked, are an important element of 
an overall enforcement regime but are probably best reserved for the most pernicious and 
persistent cases of violations. The experience thus far suggests a need for a wide 
spectrum of instruments, measures and devices to secure compliance with standards prior 
to invoking of trade sanctions.  
Third, the NAALC demonstrates the importance of public access to the process, whether 
in the bringing of complaints or in the monitoring of the official actions. The most 
effective pressures brought to bear on the cases before NAALC thus far have been those 
created by public exposure to problems that the governments have hitherto dealt with 
behind closed doors.  
Finally, experience in North America demonstrates that sanctions and moral suasion are 
not polar opposites or mutually exclusive options. Rather they are parts of a spectrum of 
measures that are available to nations and international organizations. The existence of 
the trade sanctions, even as limited as they are in NAALC, would have seemed from the 
experience thus far to have been a positive incentive to the participant nations to resolve 
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conflicts without recourse to them. This would suggest that the ILO, long the advocate of 
moral suasion as the only acceptable means to bring countries back into compliance with 
the requirements of their convention ratifications, might well be advanced in its moral 
tasks by the existence of WTO-related trade sanctions available for use against countries 
with persistent levels of refusal to honor their moral and legal commitments to the ILO.    
1. NAALC, Part Two: Obligations. Art.5: Procedural Guarantees  
1. Each Party shall ensure that its administrative, quasi-judicial and labor tribunal 
proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair, equitable and transparent and, to 
this end, each Party shall provide that:  
(a) such proceedings comply with due process of law;  
(b) any hearings in such proceedings are open to the public, except where the 
administration of justice otherwise requires;  
(c) the parties to such proceedings are entitled to support or defend their respective 
positions and to present information or evidence; and  
(d) such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail unreasonable 
charges or time limits or unwarranted delays.  
....  
4. Each Party shall ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such proceedings are 
impartial and independent and do not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the 
matter.  
 
